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Abstract This paper is the third and final one in a sequence of three. All three 
papers emphasize that a proposition can be justified by an infinite regress, on condition 
that epistemic justification is interpreted probabilistically. The first two papers showed 
this for one-dimensional chains and for one-dimensional loops of propositions, each 
proposition being justified probabilistically by its precursor. In the present paper we 
consider the more complicated case of two-dimensional nets, where each ‘child’ 
proposition is probabilistically justified by two ‘parent’ propositions. Surprisingly, it 
turns out that probabilistic justification in two dimensions takes on the form of 
Mandelbrot’s iteration. Like so many patterns in nature, probabilistic reasoning might in 
the end be fractal in character. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of a regressus ad infinitum has afflicted many branches of philosophy, and 
epistemology is no exception. As Laurence Bonjour remarks: “Considerations with 
respect to the regress argument [are] perhaps the most crucial in the entire theory of 
knowledge” (Bonjour 1985, p. 18).  
 The epistemological regress problem traditionally takes the form of an epistemic 
chain in which (a belief in) a proposition E0 is justified by (a belief in) E1, which in turn is 
justified by (a belief in) E2, and so on. Since the chain does not have a final link from 
which the justification springs, it seems that there can be no justification for E0 at all. In 
the words of Carl Ginet: 
 
“Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to 
conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all 
inferential. … [T]here can be no justification to be transferred unless ultimately 
something else, something other than the inferential relation, does create 
justification” (Ginet 2005, p. 148; emphasis by the author). 
 
In earlier papers we have shown that this problem only occurs when epistemic 
justification is seen as a form of deductive inference, where each En is deductively 
inferred from En+1. In such a classical infinite regress, the target proposition E0 can never 
receive a definite truth value. However, once we assume that each En is only made 
probable by En+1, the resolution of the problem is at hand. For an infinite probabilistic 
regress can confer a definite (unconditional) probability value on the target proposition 
E0. If this probability is greater than one half, then E0 is said to be (probabilistically) 
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justified, since in that case E0 is more likely to be true than to be false.1 In that sense a 
probabilistic regress can justify a proposition whereas a traditional, nonprobabilistic 
regress cannot. This applies not only to probabilistic regresses that have the form of one-
dimensional chains (see Atkinson and Peijnenburg 2009), but also to probabilistic 
regresses that take the shape of one-dimensional loops (see Atkinson and Peijnenburg 
2010).  
The matter becomes even more interesting if we replace the infinite one-
dimensional structure (a chain or a loop) by an infinite, many-dimensional probabilistic 
network. As Richard Fumerton has rightly observed, the regress problem is not confined 
to concerns about our ability to complete a single infinite chain; rather it manifests itself 
in all its overwhelming complexity when we realize that infinite regresses actually 
‘mushroom out’ in many different directions (Fumerton 1995, p. 57). In the present paper 
we show that this proliferating pattern, however intricate it may seem, can nevertheless 
be held in check. First, it turns out that a many-dimensional probabilistic network 
generally converges to a unique unconditional probability value for the target proposition 
E0. This means that E0 can receive a well-defined justification not only from a single 
infinite chain, but also from a complicated infinite network. Second, we found that such a 
network follows from exactly the same recursion as does the famous Mandelbrot set. The 
only requirement for obtaining these two surprising results is the condition of 
probabilistic support, i.e. each En is made probable by one other proposition (in the case 
of a one-dimensional structure) or by more than one proposition (in the case of a many-
dimensional net). 
We will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we describe an example of probabilistic 
justification by a one-dimensional epistemic chain, showing how the latter can yield a 
well-defined probability for the target proposition E0. This example draws upon our first 
paper (Atkinson and Peijnenburg 2009). In Section 3 we present a more complicated 
example of justification, namely one that has the form of a two-dimensional net. In 
Section 4 we explain the initimate relation of this net to the Mandelbrot fractal. In Section 
5, we then argue that epistemic justification still exhibits a generalized Mandelbrot 
structure even if it fans out in more than two dimensions. 
 
 
2. A one-dimensional probabilistic chain 
 
Imagine that we are trying to develop a medicine for a certain disease and that we want to 
know whether or not a particular bacterium has a certain hereditary trait T. Bacteria 
reproduce asexually, so just one parent, the ‘mother’, produces a child, the ‘daughter’. 
Suppose that we have bred several batches of bacteria, each batch growing out of one 
single primordial ancestor. This primordial ancestor might have T or might lack T – we 
do not know. However, we do know that a T-daughter is more likely to have a mother 
with T than a mother without T.  
We now randomly select from our batches one bacterium that we call Barbara-0. 
We do not know whether Barbara-0 has T, nor do we know whether the primordial 
ancestor in her batch has the trait. Let E0 be the proposition that Barbara-0  has T. E1 is the 
                                                
1 Often a threshold of acceptance (dependent on the context and greater than one-half) is introduced; and E0 
is said to be probabilistically justified if the probability that E0 is true is greater than this threshold.    
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proposition that her mother, Barbara-1, has T, E2 that her grandmother, Barbara-2, has T, 
and so on. Since E0 is more probable if E1 is true than if E1 is false, it is the case that: 
 
(1) P(E0 | E1) > P(E0 | ¬E1). 
  
Formula (1) is the condition of probabilistic support. In our example it holds for any two 
bacteria, Barbara-n and Barbara-(n+1):  
 
P(En | En+1) > P(En | ¬En+1). 
 
For the time being, however, we will only talk about Barbara-0 and Barbara-1, and thus 
about propositions E0 and E1; it is easy enough to keep in mind that what we say about 
the pair E0 and E1 also goes for E1 and E2 , for E2 and E3 , and so on.  The unconditional 
probabilities P(E0) and P(E1) are related by the rule of total probability: 
 
(2) P(E0) = P(E0 | E1) P(E1) + P(E0 | ¬E1) [1– P(E1)]. 
 
With  
 
α = P(E0 | E1)  and β = P(E0 | ¬E1) 
 
the condition of probabilistic support (1) becomes 
 
 (3) 1 > α > β > 0,  
 
where we have now explicitly excluded the extreme values 1 and 0.2 Equation (2) may 
now be rewritten in the form: 
 
(4) P(E0) = β + (α – β) P(E1). 
 
Next let us make the condition of probabilistic support quantitative by supposing that the 
probability that a T-daughter has a T-mother is 0.99, and the probability that a T-daughter 
has a T-less mother is 0.02. Thus: 
 
 (5) 1 > α = 0.99 > β = 0.02 > 0. 
 
Given (5), what is the value of P(E0), in other words what is the unconditional probability 
that the randomly selected Barbara-0 has trait T? The answer depends not only on 
whether the primordial ancestor of Barbara-0 has T, but also on the distance between this 
primordial ancestor and Barbara-0. If the primordial ancestor of Barbara-0 is simply her 
mother, viz. Barbara-1, then the distance is at its smallest. In this case the matter is 
straightforward: P(E0) is 0.99 if Barbara-1 has T, it is 0.02 if she lacks T, and it is a value 
in between those two numbers if it is uncertain whether Barbara-1 has T. If Barbara-0 has 
                                                
2 We assume for convenience that α and β remain unchanged from bacterial generation to generation. This 
assumption of uniformity simplifies the calculation, but is not essential.  
 4 
two ancestors, the distance is a little bit greater. We must now iterate formula (4), in the 
sense that we must substitute ‘β + (α – β) P(E2)’ for ‘P(E1)’: 
 
(6) P(E0) = β + (α – β) [ β + (α – β) P(E2) ], 
 
where we are assuming that α and β are known and keep their values throughout the 
chain. With this assumption, we find that P(E0) is 0.9803 if E2 is true, and 0.0394 if E2 is 
false. The greater the distance is between Barbara-0 and her primeval parent, the more 
often will (4) have to be iterated, and the smaller will be the influence of the primeval 
parent on Barbara-0. If the primal ancestor is very far away, then it hardly matters for the 
value of P(E0) whether she has T or lacks T. The difference between the two extreme 
values of P(E0) will be tiny, and P(E0) will mainly be determined by the joint conditional 
probabilities that separate Barbara-0 from her original ancestor. For instance, if Barbara-0 
has one hundred and fifty ancestors, so that the chain starts with Barbara-150, then the 
contribution of E150 to the unconditional probability of E0 will be rather small. Indeed, if 
E150 is false, so that Barbara-150 does not have T, the probability of E0  (‘Barbara-0 has 
T’) is 0.660, which is only marginally different from 0.670 – the number that we find 
when we assume that Barbara-150  has T. 
What happens if the number of ancestors of Barbara-0 is infinite? We can now 
give a clear answer to this question: then it does not matter whether the infinitely remote 
ancestor has T or lacks T. In this infinite case, the primordial mother has completely 
disappeared from the picture. All the probabilistic justification for E0 now comes from 
the conditional probabilities, and none comes from the infinitely distant Urmutter. This 
does not imply, as Ginet and many others have thought, that there is no justification at all. 
On the contrary. Although all the justification for E0 is inferential, E0 is still 
probabilistically justified. We are able to compute a uniquely determined value for P(E0), 
the unconditional probability of E0, even though the justification consists of an infinite 
chain of conditional probabilities; with the quantities chosen for α and β in (5), we find 
that P(E0) equals ⅔ .  In this case E0  has been probabilistically justified, since E0 has been 
shown to be probably true – indeed, any threshold of acceptance between ½ and ⅔ may 
be adopted in this case.3 
 
 
 
3. A two-dimensional probabilistic net 
 
It might be objected that our result in the previous section is based on an unrealistic 
simplification. For real epistemic justification is of course much richer and much more 
                                                
3 Our claim that “all the probabilistic justification for E0 now comes from the conditional probabilities” 
might engender the question how the conditional probabilities themselves are to be justified. (We thank an 
anonymous referee for having raised this issue.) Although this question is not the subject of the present 
paper (which only deals with the probabilistic justification of the target proposition E0), our first, tentative, 
answer would be that the conditional probabilities are justified by further probabilities, where the latter can 
be conditional or unconditional. This answer will not satisfy the convinced foundationalist, but we are not 
sure we understand what sort of answer would satisfy her. Of course, one could define ‘justification’ as 
something that can only come from a source that itself is in no need of justification. But such a definition 
would, we think, come close to a petitio.  
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complicated than a one-dimensional chain. As Richard Fumerton has observed, “infinite 
regresses are mushrooming out in … different directions”, so anybody who “worr[ies] 
about the possibility of completing one infinitely long chain of reasoning, … should be 
downright depressed about the possibility of completing an infinite number of infinitely 
long chains of reasoning” (Fumerton 1995, p. 57). 
 In the present section we deal with these worries. We explain what happens when 
we replace the infinite one-dimensional probabilistic chain by an infinite probabilistic 
network in more than one dimension. Our investigation reveals that things are not as grim 
as Fumerton suggests, and that the situation is on the contrary extremely intriguing. For 
first, a many-dimensional network of conditional probabilities generally yields a definite 
unconditional probability for the target proposition E0. And second, this network leads to 
an iteration that is precisely the same as Mandelbrot’s recursion.  
We start by considering a two-dimensional net, where a proposition is linked 
probabilistically to two others. In the next section we show that this net is directly related 
to the Mandelbrot set. At the end of this paper, in Section 5, we will sketch what happens 
when we extend the net to more than two dimensions.  
A two-dimensional net could serve as a model for the propagation of genetic traits 
under sexual reproduction, in which the traits of a child are related probabilistically to 
those of both mother and father. Let P(E0) again be the unconditional probability that 
Barbara-0 has trait T. However, this time Barbara-0 is an organism with two parents, a 
father and a mother. For the purpose of fixing ideas it will prove convenient to talk about 
sexual reproduction and about fathers and mothers, but we should bear in mind that the 
formalism is much more general. 
 Since Barbara-0 stems from two parents, the probability that she has T is related 
to her mother and to her father. Rather than two reference classes (the mother having or 
not having T), we now have four: both the mother and the father have T, neither of them 
has it, the father has T but the mother does not, and the mother has T but the father does 
not. The corresponding four conditional probabilities can be represented as follows: 
 
α = P(E0 | E1(f) & E1(m))   
β = P(E0 | ¬E1(f) &¬E1(m))    
γ = P(E0 | E1 (f) & ¬E1(m))  
δ = P(E0 | ¬E1(f) & E1(m)), 
 
where α means “the probability that Barbara-0 has T, given that her father has it, E1(f), 
and that her mother has it, E1(m)”, and where β, γ and δ are given analogous readings. In 
this case, the analogue of the rule of total probability (2) is: 
 
(7) P(E0) = α P(E1(f) & E1(m)) + β P(¬E1(f) &¬E1(m)) +  
 γ P(E1(f) & ¬E1(m)) + δ P(¬E1(f) & E1(m)).4  
 
                                                
4 Of course, in this two-dimensional case Barbara-0 also has a gender, and can in turn become either a 
father or a mother. In the first case the statement that Barbara-0 has T must be written as E0 (f), in the 
second case as E0 (m). Since we are going to assume that the presence of T is independent of the gender  – 
see the main text – we will suppress Barbara-0’s gender and continue writing  E0. 
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To iterate the two-dimensional Equation (7), as we did with the one-dimensional (2) and 
(4), we would now need more complicated relations for the unconditional probabilities 
appearing in this expression. It is no longer sufficient to consider P(E1) and replace it by 
‘β + (α – β) P(E2)’, for now we are dealing with the probability of a conjunction of two 
parents, P(E1(f) & E1(m)). Each of these parents has two parents, so we encounter in fact  
the probabilities of conjunctions of four individuals (the four ‘grandparents’). This can be 
continued further and further, involving more and more progenitors. Such seething 
complication is the very essence of how many natural systems work, but it is difficult to 
express the full complexity in iterated versions of (7). 
 Fortunately, however, we can make simplifying assumptions. Here we will work 
under three simplifications (which we will relax in Section 5). 
1. Independence. The probabilities for the occurrence of the trait T in females and in 
males are independent of one another in any of the n generations: P(En(f) & En(m)) = 
P(En(f)) × P(En(m)). This assumption seems reasonable when we are dealing with 
sexual reproduction in a large population where sibling impregnation is taboo. 
2. Gender symmetry. The probability of the occurrence of the trait T is the same for 
females and for males in any of the n generations: P(En(f)) = P(En(m)). This implies 
that we only consider inheritable traits which are gender-independent, such as having 
blue eyes or being red-haired (and not, for example, having breast cancer or being 
taller than two meters). With this assumption ‘f’ and ‘m’ can be dropped, and in 
combination with the first assumption we obtain: P(En(f) & En(m)) = P(En)P(En) = 
P2(En).  
3. Uniformity. The conditional probabilities are the same in any of the n generations. In 
other words, α, β, γ and δ remain the same throughout the net.  
 
Together these assumptions enable us to simplify (7) to 
 
(8) P(E0) = α P2 (E1) + β P2 (¬E1) + (γ + δ) P(E1) P(¬E1). 
 
This expression equates P(E0) to the sum of three terms, each of which reflects the 
probability that Barbara-0 has T, given that both her parents have it, or that neither parent 
has it, or that only one parent has it. Equation (8) can be written in the form  
 
(9) P(E0) =  β +  (γ + δ − 2 β) P(E1)  +  (α +  β −  γ − δ) P2 (E1)  
 
(see the appendix). In the special case that 
 
 (10) α + β = γ + δ, 
 
the third term of (9) is zero, and what remains is the same as Equation (4). In other 
words, in the special case (10) the two-dimensional quadratic Equation (9) reduces to the 
one-dimensional linear form (4). 
When the special equality (10) does not hold, this reduction is impossible; then 
the P2 term describes an essentially new situation. It is precisely when P2 does not 
disappear that probabilistic justification exhibits the same structure as the Mandelbrot set. 
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For in that case, as we will explain in the next section, the quadratic relation (9) turns out 
to be equivalent to Benoît Mandelbrot’s famous fractal generating recursion.  
 
 
4. The Mandelbrot Set 
 
Some thirty years ago Mandelbrot introduced his celebrated iteration:  
 
(11) qn+1 = c + (qn)2, 
 
where c and q are complex numbers (Mandelbrot 1977). Starting with q0  = 0, the 
iteration (11) gives us successively  
 
q1  = c,   
q2  = c + c2,   
q3  = c + (c + c2) 2,  
q4  = c + {c + (c + c2) 2}2 , and so on.  
 
For many values of c, the iteration will diverge, allowing qn to grow beyond any bound as 
n becomes larger and larger. For example, if c = 1 we obtain  
   
q1  = 1,   
q2  = 2,   
q3  = 5,  
q4  = 26,  and so on. 
 
But if for instance c = 0.1, then qn does not diverge, and in this case actually converges  
to the number 0.11271… Taken together, all the values of c for which the iteration (11) 
does not diverge form the Mandelbrot set, which can be visualized in the following well-
known picture: 
 
 
Figure 1: the Mandelbrot set 
 
The black area contains the points that belong to the Mandelbrot set. Each point 
corresponds to a complex number, c, being the ordered pair of the Cartesian coordinates,  
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(x , y). The edge of the Mandelbrot set forms the boundary between those values of c that 
are members of the Mandelbrot set and those that are not. This boundary, the 
‘Mandelbrot fractal’, has the property of being infinitely structured in a remarkable way: 
no matter how far you zoom in on it, you will always find a new structure that is similar 
to, although not completely identical with, the Mandelbrot set itself.  
 Our aim in this section is to demonstrate that, when (10) does not hold, the 
quadratic relation (9) is equivalent to the Mandelbrot iteration (11). As it turns out, c will 
be a function of the conditional probabilities α, β, γ and δ alone, and will thus be a known 
quantity. The q’s, on the other hand, will be directly related to the unconditional 
probabilities; these are unknown and their values are to be determined through the 
iteration.  
First it will prove convenient to define 
 
 ε = ½ (γ + δ),  
 
which is the mean conditional probability that the target – in our case Barbara-0 – has the 
trait T, given that only one of the parents has T. Equation (9)  now becomes  
 
 P(E0) =  β +  2 (ε − β) P(E1)  +  (α +  β −  2 ε) P2 (E1) , 
 
or more generally  
 
(12) P(En) =  β +  2 (ε − β) P(En+1)  +  (α +  β −  2 ε) P2 (En+1) . 
 
At first sight, this iteration may not look very much like the Mandelbrot form (11). In the 
latter we go upwards as it were, starting from qn and then counting to qn+1 , whereas in 
(12) we start with P(En+1) and iterate downwards to P(En). Moreover, (12) is about 
conditional and unconditional probabilities, and thus about real numbers between zero 
and one, whereas (11) is an uninterpreted formula involving complex numbers. On closer 
inspection, however, we see that there is an important similarity between (11) and (12). 
For both are quadratic expressions: the former contains (qn)2 and the latter P2(En+1).
 In order to transform (12) into (11) we introduce a linear mapping that serves to 
remove from (12) the term 2 (ε − β) P(En+1), and also the coefficient (α + β − 2 ε). The 
unique linear mapping that does the trick, P(En) → qn , is defined by  
 
(13) qn = (α +  β −  2 ε ) P(En)  − β + ε . 
 
On substituting (12) for P(En) in (13) we obtain a formula that can be rewritten as  
 
 (14) qn = ε (1 −  ε ) − β (1 −  α ) + (qn+1) 2 . 
 
The details of the transition from (12) and (13) to (14) can be found in the appendix.  
Now define  
 
 (15) c = ε (1 −  ε ) − β (1 −  α ). 
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Note that c involves only the conditional probabilities, α, β and ε, and so is an invariant 
quantity during the execution of the iteration. On the other hand, qn also contains the  
unconditional probability, P(En), which we seek to evaluate through the iteration. With 
the definition (15),  Equation (14) becomes  
 
 (16) qn = c + (qn+1) 2. 
 
Evidently (16) is very similar to the standard Mandelbrot iteration (11). There is only one 
cosmetic difference to which we already alluded: instead of an iteration upwards from n 
= 0, the iteration in (16) proceeds from a large n value, corresponding to the primeval 
parents, down to the target child proposition at n = 0. Of course this difference has no 
significance for the iteration as such. 
 We are now in a position to take advantage of some of the lore that has 
accumulated about the Mandelbrot iteration. Some but not all: epistemic justification as 
we discuss it here deals with probabilities and those are real numbers, rather than 
complex ones, so we must concentrate on the real subset of the complex numbers c in 
(15), namely those for which c = ( x , 0 ), corresponding to the x-axis in Figure 1. It 
should be noted that, when c is real, all the qn are automatically real (cf. the explicit 
expressions for the first few n-values, just after Equation (11)).  
It is known that the real interval −2 ≤ c ≤ ¼  lies within the Mandelbrot set, but 
not all of these values correspond to an iteration that converges to a unique limiting 
value. However, let us now impose the condition of probabilistic support with exclusion 
of zero and one, namely 
 
 (3’) 1 > α > β > 0.  
 
Then we can show from (15) that − ¼ < c  <  ¼ (see the appendix). In this domain the 
Mandelbrot iteration is known to converge to a unique limit. If α,  β and ε are such that 
this limit corresponds to a value of P(E0) which is greater than a half (or more generally 
greater than some agreed threshold), then E0 has been probabilistically justified.  
 Although (3’) resembles (3), which was the requirement of probabilistic support 
for the one-dimensional chain, it should be realized that α and β do not have quite the 
same meanings in the two contexts. For the one-dimensional chain, α > β means that the 
probability of the child’s having trait T is greater if the mother has it than if the mother 
does not have it. For the two-dimensional net, however, α > β means that the probability 
of the child’s having trait T is greater if both of her parents have it than if neither of them 
do. It is interesting in this case that the probability of the child’s having T if only one of 
her parents has T plays no role: ε may have any value between one and zero, including 
zero itself, for (3’) is a sufficient condition that c > −¼. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Present day epistemology is suffused with the idea that justification comes in degrees, but 
the implication has yet to be fully understood. It is that a proposition can still have a fixed 
probability, not only when it is justified by an infinite one-dimensional chain, but also by 
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an infinite two-dimensional network. Moreover, this network is generated by the same 
recursion that produces the Mandelbrot set in the complex plane. True, we have only to 
do with the real line between −¼ and + ¼ , and not with the complex plane (where the 
remarkable fractal structure is apparent). But the point is that the algorithm which 
produces our sequence of probabilities, and that which generates the Mandelbot fractal, 
are exactly the same. Note, incidentally, that the real domain extends to x = ¼ , which is 
on the edge of the Mandelbrot set, i.e., it is a point in the fractal itself. 
 We have used three simplifying assumptions in proving this, viz. those of gender 
symmetry, independence, and uniformity. There are however strong indications that 
essentially similar results also hold when these assumptions are dropped. Imagine a 
situation in which the probabilities are different for males and females, as is the case if 
we consider, for example, the property of being more than two meters tall. Then there 
will be two quadratic iterations, one for P(En(f)) and one for P(En(m)). Each of these is 
related to P(En+1(f)) as well as P(En+1(m)). This means that the quadratic iterations are 
coupled, so the fixed points will satisfy quartic rather than quadratic equations. The latter 
however is just a technical complication, for it is still possible to find a domain in which 
the iterations converge. The relation is in fact a generalized Mandelbrot iteration, being 
of fourth order, rather than second order, and analogous results obtain. This indicates that 
the assumption of gender symmetry is not necessary for the argument that probabilistic 
justification has a Mandelbrot structure. 
The same goes for the assumption that the parents are independent. Clearly, if the 
parent probabilities depend on one another, we may have to include into the equation 
grandparents, and perhaps great-grandparents, which of course complicates matters 
considerably. However, in general terms it means nothing more than that the final fixed-
point equations will be of order even higher than four. Again a generalized Mandelbrot-
style iteration will hold sway, and again domains of convergence exist. 
Furthermore, in many situations the conditional probabilities may not be uniform, 
changing from generation to generation. In those cases the iteration will become 
considerably more involved. We have seen that for the one-dimensional chain it proved 
possible to write down explicitly the result of concatenating an arbitrary number of steps. 
It is true that for a two-dimensional net this would be very cumbersome. However, with 
the use of a fixed-point theorem it is relatively simple to give conditions under which 
convergence once more occurs under changing values of α, β, γ and δ.  
What will happen when the network has more dimensions than two? The answer 
is straightforward: then the iterations and the fixed-point equations are of progressively 
higher and higher order, necessitating computer programs for their calculation, but the 
picture remains essentially the same. The probabilities are determined by polynomial 
recurrent expressions, and there is always a domain in which they are uniquely 
determined. 
We conclude that probabilistic epistemic justification has a structure that gives 
rise to a generalized Mandelbrot recursion; and this still holds when we abandon our 
three simplifying assumptions, and work in more than two dimensions. Like so many 
other patterns in nature, our reasoning may well have an intriguing relation to simple 
algorithms that can generate a fractal form. 
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Appendix 
 
(i)  Derivation of (9) from  
(8) P(E0) = α P2 (E1) + β P2 (¬E1) + (γ + δ) P(E1) P(¬E1) 
 
Demonstration: 
 P(E0)  = αP2(E1) + β[1−P(E1)]2 + (γ+δ)P(E1)[1−P(E1)]  
   =  αP2(E1) + β[1−2P(E1)+P2(E1)]  + (γ+δ)[P(E1) − P2(E1)] 
Collect all terms involving P(E1) together, and likewise all terms involving P2 (E1):  
(9) P(E0) =  β +  (γ + δ − 2 β) P(E1)  +  (α +  β −  γ − δ) P2 (E1)  
 
(ii)  Derivation of (14) from   
(12) P(En) =  β +  2 (ε − β) P(En+1)  +  (α +  β −  2 ε) P2(En+1)  
(13) qn = (α +  β −  2 ε ) P(En)  − β + ε  
 
Demonstration: 
qn = (α +  β −  2 ε ) P(En)  − β + ε 
= (α +  β −  2 ε ) [β +  2 (ε − β) P(En+1)  +  (α +  β −  2 ε) P2 (En+1)] − β + ε 
= (α +  β −  2 ε ) β + 2 (ε − β)[(α +  β − 2 ε )P(En+1)]  +  [(α +  β −  2 ε)P(En+1)]2 − β + ε 
However, after replacing n by n +1 in (13), we see that  
[(α +  β − 2 ε )P(En+1)] = β − ε + qn+1 , 
and therefore  
qn  = (α +  β −  2 ε ) β + 2 (ε − β) (β − ε + qn+1) + (β − ε + qn+1)2 − β + ε 
 = αβ  −  ε2  + (qn+1)2 − β + ε  
and so  
 (14) qn = ε (1 −  ε ) − β (1 −  α ) + (qn+1) 2  
 
 
(iii)  To show that − ¼ < c < ¼ , if  0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 and 0 <  β < α  < 1 , where  
 (15) c = ε (1 −  ε ) − β (1 −  α ) 
 
Demonstration: 
(a)  c  <  ε (1 −  ε ) =  ¼  −  (½ −  ε )2  ≤ ¼ 
(b) c ≥ − β (1 −  α ) > − α (1 −  α ) = (½ −  α )2 −¼ ≥ −¼ 
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